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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
RULE OF LAW
RAOUL BERGER*

In his article, The Specious Morality of the Law,l Professor
Sanford Levinson 2 brands various calls for maintenance of the rule
of law under the Constitution a "ritualistic incantation" and de
plores the divorce of law from moral norms. 3 He maintains that a
law that is merely identified with majority "will" is not, in terms
of moral integrity, worthy of respect, because the majority "no
tion of justice" may be "perceived as manifest tyranny by someone
else." Why should "those who feel tyrannized by the existing legal
order . . . recognize it as legitimate?"4 Add his emphasis that
"[l]iberty has come to focus on freedom from the community or the
State,"5 and Levinson verges on an invitation to disregard for law,
at a time, as even he acknowledges, when except "reverence for
law . . . there is no other basis for uniting a nation of so many
disparate groupS."6 His counsel to resist "the call for new faith in
an old gospel"7 requires more solid footing than he has furnished.
• Raoul Berger, a well-known constitutional scholar, is the author ofIMPEACH
MENT, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, and numerous legal arti
cles. From 1971 to 1976, he was Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal
History at Harvard Law School. In May, 1978, the University of Michigan awarded
him an honorary doctorate.
1. S. Levinson, The Specious Morality of the Law, HARPER'S, May, 1977, at 35.
2. Professor Levinson is a lawyer and teaches in the department of politics at
Princeton University.
3. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36.
4. [d. at 38, 40.
5. [d. at 36.
6. [d. at 41.
7. [d. at 35.
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I

Levinson begins by dismissing Barbara Jordan's "total" com
mitment to the Constitution in the course of the House Judiciary
Hearings on the impeachment of President Nixon as incomprehen
sible because "presumably" she would not have thought the origi
nal Constitution which "protected slavery . . . worthy of venera
tion."8 One may as well reject the great cultural achievements of
the Greeks because the Athenians were slaveholders, and a slave
was heartlessly defined by Aristotle as "a tool with life in it."9 Each
society must be judged by standards of its own time and historical
context. To transport Barbara Jordan back 200 years in time-when
a nation aborning compromised with slaveholding states the better
to face a hostile world-is not nearly so fruitful as to view the
world in which she lives, where in the Africa where she has her
roots Idi Amin slaughters thousands of fellow blacks in Uganda and
is regarded admiringly by many Africans. Well might she prefer to
live. under a constitution that secures her against such horrors,
even though it falls short of perfection.
Philosophers, William James said, devote themselves to study
'of those residual questions on which people are unable to agree,
among them the nature of "law. "10 The thin air of philosophy is
not for an earthbound lawyer, so I shall attempt in more mundane
fashion first to examine what the Constitutio~ and the rule of law
meant to the Founders, and why that meaning remains vitally im
portant for us today.
. After a long and bitter struggle, the Founders had succeeded
in throwing off the shackles of an "omnipotent parliament" and
hereditary monarch. l l Now they proclaimed that the people were
sovereign and that all power was delegated by them to their "ser
vants and agents." Schooled in the insatiable greed for power of
those given to rule, the Founders grudgingly enumerated the
granted powers and repeatedly stressed that those grants were
"limited. "12 Their fear of arbitrary power led them to insist on
standing laws, not, as the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution em
phasized, laws passed after the fact which retroactively made a
8.

[d. at 35, 36.

1 C. BRINTON, J. CHRISTOPHER, & R. WOLFF, A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION
67 (1960).
10. Singer, A Discipline Examining Nature's Ultimate Reality, N.Y. Times,
May 8, 1977, § 4 (Week in Review), at 20, col. 1.
11. See R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 34-35 (1969).
12. Id. at 13-16.
9.
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nonproscribed act criminal. 13 They wanted no personal justice ad
ministered after the fashion of Caliph Haroun-al-Rashid, but rather
the administration of known laws with an absolute minimum of dis
cretion. As Jefferson graphically put it, the Founders sought to
bind man down with "the chains of the Constitution" because they
had no confidence in rulers.14 They regarded the Constitution
with "sacred reverence," in Hamilton's words, because they con
sidered that it constituted the "bulwark" of their liberties. IS
This is what John Adams meant by "a government of laws and
not of men," not, as Levinson would have it, a linkage with "moral
norms."16 Adams' biographer, Page Smith, confirms that Adams
meant by that phrase that "men are· secured in their rights to life,
liberty and property by clear and fair laws, falling equally on all
... justly administered," differentiating a society where a king be
stows rights at "whim" as "a society of men, not of laws. "17 When
one affirms the continuing indispensability of this structure, he
does not, as Levinson charges, "embrace the rule of law as an an
swer to the problems of modem governance. "18 No structure of
government can supply the "answer," it can only furnish a
framework within which each generation can strive for a peaceable
solution of clashing aims. Surely this generation need not be re
minded that uncurbed power, abandonment of the rule of law, re
turns us to the law of the jungle or, worse, the crematoria of Au
schwitz and Belsen. It is easy enough for one sheltered by the rule
of law blithely to dismiss it, but the Indians who lived for a time
without its protection under Indira Ghandi have recently greeted
its return with jubilation. 19
II

Levinson maintains that most pre-nineteenth century adher
ents of the rule of law viewed law as being linked with moral
norms. 20 For this postulate, Levinson relies on Adams and traces
13. Bill of Rights, Article 24, reprinted in H.S. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF
AMERlCAN HISTORY 109 (7th ed. 1962).
14. R. BERGER, supra note 11, at 13 (quoting C. WARREN, CONGRESS 153
(1935)).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 158 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
16. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36.
17. 1 P. SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 246 (1962).
18. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36.
19. Borders, India's Courts Welcome Back 'Rule of Law,' N.Y. Times, June 14,
1977, § L, at 2, col. 2.
20. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
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the lineage back to the medieval jurist, Bracton, who linked law to
God. Law was defined by the medievalist as the "natural reason
[natural law] given by God," or "as the commands of political lead
ers ordained by God and therefore given the right to rule. "21
Adams, however, flatly repudiated monarchical rule by divine
right. 22 His 1780 Massachusetts Constitution described the body
politic as "a social compact" whereby the whole people covenant
with each citizen that "all shall be governed by certain [known]
laws for the common good," in order that "every man may ... find
his security in them. "23 So too, natural law, like the "mandate from
heaven" of Chinese emperors, which was known only to them, col
lides with Adams' commitment to "clear laws," known to al1. 24 This
commitment is underscored by his lengthy Bill of Rights in the
1780 Constitution, which particularizes rights to be protected
against the goverhment or community. The ban on the quartering
of soldiers in private homes,25 for example, reflects a practical
rather than a moral concern.
It is true that Adams referred to the duty of the state to incul
cate a common morality. Nevertheless, he wrote, "It is certain ...
that the only moral foundation of government is the consent of the
people. "26 While he was attached to the "moral basis of life, the
need for religion, "27 Adams maintained that "[g]ood laws and or
derly government alone would protect 'lives, liberties, religion,
property, and characters.' "28 He had long been convinced that
"neither philosophy, nor religion, nor morality . . . will ever gov
ern nations. . . . Nothing but force in the fonn of soundly drawn
consitutions and firm laws could restrain men. "29 His were not
counsels of a heavenly city of moral perfectibility, but a hard
headed response to man's inherent selfishness.
Not that Adams' views are for present purposes crucial, for
Levinson himself notes that Jefferson believed that it "was the will
of the nation which makes the law obligatory. "30 In this belief Jef
S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36.
See 2 P. SMITH, supra note 17, at 692-93.
H.S. COMMAGER, supra note 13, at 107.
See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 251-52 (1977).
25. Bill of Rights, Article 27, reprinted in H.S. COMMAGER, supra note 13, at
109.
26. 1 P. SMITH, supra note 17, at 258.
27. Id. at 274.
28. 2 P. SMITH, supra note 17, at 690.
29. Id. at 274.
30. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 37.
21.

22.
23.
24.
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ferson was joined by James Wilson, second only to Madison as an
architect of the Constitution. "[P]opular sovereignty, rooted in will
rather than in a common moral order," Levinson recognizes, "was
to become the motif of the new American polity. "31 This view, that
positive law, expressed in constitutions and laws, represented the
will of the people, was shared by Adams, Hamilton, Madison, and
Wilson. 32 It was later reformulated by Justice Holmes and remains,
as Levinson notes, "the dominant view" of American constitutional
law. 33 It was a radical shift from Bracton's notions of law, but
those medieval notions had little or no place in the thinking of the
Founders, including Adams.
Those of us who are firmly convinced that Richard Nixon was
properly forced out of office because of impeachable offenses can
not concur with Levinson that the "rule of law . . . provided an
ostensibly apolitical rationale for driving from office a scoundrel
who richly deserved his fate. "34 Such a result-oriented judgment
would be a reproach to American justice. As one who searched the
history of the constitutional impeachment provisions before the
Nixon impeachment rose on the horizon,35 I am convinced that by
established standards Nixon committed impeachable offenses.
Levinson intimates that the impeachment leaders were not
viewed as "subordinate to general conceptions of public morality,"
and cites the contention of the 10 Republican dissenters on the
House Judiciary Committee that there "was no specific law pro
hibiting 'abuse of power,''' the offense with which Nixon was
charged. 36 But "abuse of power" was a classic rubric of "high
crimes and misdemeanors," and since it therefore had constitu
tional warrant it needed no statutory sanction. When the Republi
can dissenters argued that an "abuse of power" could not merely
be what seems improper "in the subjective view of a temporary
majority of legislators," a view apparently shared by Levinson, 37
they equally impugned the time-worn judicial and jury function of
determining what conduct was "unreasonable" under the circum
stances. No legal formula, be it "restraint of trade," "negligent
conduct," or "abuse of power," can do more than pose the particu
31. Id.
32. R. BERGER, supra note 24, at 252.
33. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 37-38.
34. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
35. See Berger, Impeachment for "High Crimes and Misdemeanors," 44 S.C.L.
REV. 395 (1971).
36. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 38 n.
37. I d. (emphasis in original).
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lar case for judgment. Each Congress, like each judge or jury,
must independently decide whether the facts at bar make out the
charge. Agreed that the Senate, sitting in judgment, should consult
the precedents of the past-of which the English, from where the
terms "high crimes and misdemeanors" were drawn, are more im
portant than the post-Constitution Senate precedents-and that it
should not arbitrarily label a trivial act as an "abuse." But the re
calcitrant Republicans fought tooth and nail to prevent the issue
from going to the Senate. To cast them in the role of paladins of
"public morality" is little short of grotesque.
At bottom Levinson objects to majority rule. "[A]bsolute ac
quiescence in the decisions of the majority," said Jefferson, is a
"vital principle of republics. "38 Where would we be after a bitterly
fought election if the defeated minority took to the streets to reject
the will of the majority? For the protection of minorities, certain
rights were placed in the Constitution beyond majority reach. Like
all human endeavors, this is not a perfect shield. The reconciliation
of minority and majority interests, as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote,
presents an insoluble problem. 39 Certainly it is not likely to be
solved by invoking "moral norms." One can say of "moral norms"
what David Hume said of "natural law": "The word natural is
commonly taken in so many senses, and is of so loose a significa
tion, that it seems vain to dispute whether justice be natural or
not. "40 Conceptions of what is "moral" have differed from time to
time, from country to country. For the Inquisition, morality de
manded that heretics be burned at the stake; southern ministers
preached that slavery was divinely ordained. "[S]o much that was
thought [to be] wisdom," said Bertrand Russell, "turned out to be
folly. "41 Levinson acknowledges that insistence on a "linkage be
tween law and moral norms . . . assume[s] a moral consensus
which no longer exists. . . . "42 Where, then, are we to derive
moral norms? Few will be prepared to look for them in some
Platonic absolute about which philosophers will forever dispute.
Justice Holmes, that most philosophical of jurists, wrote, "[N]oth
ing but confusion of thought can result from assuming that the

38.
39.
40.

A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 401 (1947).
Id. at 421.
Quoted in R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY
PROCESS 23 (1975).
41. B. RUSSELL, PORTRAITS FROM MEMORY 197 (1956).
42. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 99.

AND THE JUDIClAL
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rights of man in a moral sense are equally rights in the sense of the
constitution and the laws. "43
III
As an offshoot of his "moral norms," Levinson differentiates
between current "moral pluralism" and the halcyon community
sharing "a common religious or moral order. "44 In truth that com
munity was more divided than we are today. Roger Williams did
not flee Massachusetts because he shared a "common religious or
der." Whether Quakers and Mennonites of Pennsylvania shared
that "order" with Catholics of Maryland, or the Scotch-Irish non
conformists with the Tidewater Episcopal establishment of Virginia,
may be doubted.
A "community sharing a common moral vision"45 in terms of
the federal Constitution, to which Levinson's discussion is directed,
romanticizes the facts. In 1787 the people viewed a remote, cen
tralized federal government with suspicion rather than as an ex
pression of a "common vision." Such distrust was bred in the bone
of those who had fled from European tyranny and oppression. Sent
to Congress in Philadelphia from Georgia in 1785, William Hous
ton "thought of himself as leaving his 'country' to go to a strange
land among Strangers."46 Madison said, "[O]f the affairs of Georgia
I know as little as those of Kamskatska. "47 The Southern States
feared that they would be oppressed by the North; small states
were fearful of the large; the interests of importing and non
importing states diverged; there were quarrels over fisheries; a
state imposed imposts on vessels that came from or went to
another as if it were a foreign nation. 48 Above all there was a vital
lack of power to deal with commerce and defense on a national
scale. It was such worldly considerations, not a "common moral
vision," which led to the creation of the national "community."
Early America, in sum, was not "tied together" by shared "moral
nonns" but rather, as Tocqueville perceived, "by the common pur
suit of individual interests. "49
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
(1965).
49.

171-72 (1920).
S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36.
[d.
R. BERGER, supra note 11, at 33.
[d.
See S.E. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 304
O. HOLMES, JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS

S. RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION 47 (1942).
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In primeval America, Adams, according to Levinson, believed
individuals were "willing to subordinate their selfish personal
interest in behalf of a 'common good,''' ready "to recognize pri
mary obligation to the community," whereas today "most of us cer
tainly believe that our primary duties are to ourselves and our
families. Liberty has come to focus on freedom from the commu
nity or the state rather than the realization of a common vision
through the community. . . . "50 Preoccupation with the self is
nothing new. Adams considered that only "force in the form of ...
constitutions" would restrain the beast. 51 A wise government, said
Jefferson, would "restrain men from injuring one another" and
"leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits. "52 Gov
ernment was instituted, said Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST No. 15,
"because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of
reason and justice, without restraint. "53 "What is government it
self," asked THE FEDERALIST No. 51, "but the greatest of all re
flections on human nature? If men were angels no government
would be necessary."54 In short, that "old devil," selfish personal
interest, was no less present in 1787 than it is today.
With the passage of 200 years, men have turned to the "com
munity" in a manner originally undreamed of, for welfare, sub
sidies, and other contributions. How is this reconcilable with
"freedom from the community"? At no time has .the majority been
as ready to help minorities as today; it taxes itself heavily to aid the
helpless. And what but a "moral vision of the community" can ac
count for the billions of dollars in food and aid America has sent to
foreign nations. To make the test of "moral vision" turn on the
treatment of minorities is to ignore that racial discrimination is a
stubborn, worldwide phenomenon with which "law" may be in
adequate to deal. It is no reproach to the Constitution that it has
not remade man. It could only impose such restraints as he would
accept and provide a framework in which he could work out his
own destiny.
IV
Levinson denies the existence of "an enduring, timeless Con
stitution" because its meaning has changed over time, and con
50.
51.

S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36 (emphasis original).
See note 29 supra and accompanying text.

52. H.C. HOCKE'IT, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF
1492-1828, at 272 (1931).
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 92 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
54. [d. at 337.

THE UNITED STATES,
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eludes that "A faith whose premises change radically over time is
scarcely the rock upon which to rely for support. . . . "55 It would
be more accurate to say that over the years the Supreme Court has
undertaken to revise the Constitution, to read into it preferences of
a given majority of the Court, even in flat contradiction of the
meaning attached to the terms by the Framers. In Levinson's
words, the Court has"suppl[ied] new meanings. "56
A quick example of these "new meanings" is furnished by the
words "due process of law." At the adoption of the Constitution,
Alexander Hamilton, reflecting historical usage, declared that these
words "are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the
courts of justice; they can never be referred to an act of the legisla
ture. "57 The records of the several Conventions and of the First
Congress which drafted the fifth amendment contain no evidence
to the contrary, and Hamilton's view was also that of the framers of
the fourteenth amendment. 58 Notwithstanding, in the 1890s the
Court transformed due process into an instrument for the over
throw of socio-economic legislation, thereby substituting its own
will for that of the people, and giving rise to an "unwritten con
stitution." No admirer of such judicial "change" has ever pointed to
the constitutional warrant for this revisory function; instead there is
solid ground for the conclusion that such authority was withheld
from the Court. Hamilton branded such judicial action an impeach
able "usurpation. "59 Here Levinson, however, echoes conventional
approval of judicial "change." But Justices as diverse as Chief Jus
tice Burger, Justice Douglas, and Justice Frankfurter are agreed
that the touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself,
not what the Court has said about it. 6o
"Can we accept a definition of 'the law,''' asks Levinson,
"as anything other than that which is declared by the Supreme
Court . . . ?"61 The Constitution is not an inscrutable mystery which
yields its secrets only to a black-robed priesthood. Time and again
the Court has rejected its own earlier constitutional decisions. For
decades commentators, and eminent jurists, Holmes, Brandeis,
Stone, Learned Hand, refused to accept the Court's identification
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36, 42.
Id. See generally R. BERGER, supra note 24, at 370-72.
R. BERGER, supra note 24, at 194 (emphasis added).
Id. at 201-06.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 526-27 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
R. BERGER, supra note 24, at 297 n.57.
S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36.
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of its laissez-faire prepossessions with constitutional dogma
whereby it blocked social and economic reform. Ultimately that
educational process led the Court to acknowledge error. 62 Unfortu
nately, similar scholarly criticism of the Court's subsequent iden
tification of its libertarian predilections with constitutional man
dates,63 for the most part, has been lacking because the judicial
course now corresponded with the aspirations of academe and led
it to mute its criticism. "Scholarly exposure of the Court's abuse of
its powers," said Justice Frankfurter, would "bring about a shift in
the Court's viewpoint. "64 Heightened public awareness rather than
"self-help"-" 'taking the law into our own hands' upon recognizing
that established officials [Nixon or the Court] are unwilling to fol
low 'the law' "6S-appears to me a better alternative. Mter the
"Saturday Night Massacre," an aroused public repudiated Nixon's
excesses and drove him from the White House. The Court, Profes
sor Charles Black wrote, would not have "the strength to prevail in
the face of resolute public repudiation of its legitimacy," or of the
legitimacy of its decisions. 66
V

Levinson glides over the problems presented by judicial
"change," among them government by judiciary, and draws instead
on a number of presidential acts to show that the "imperatives of
the Constitutional system" have not "remained constant since the
establishment of the Constitutional system in 1789. "67 These, he
avers, "present problems for anyone seeking an unequivocal
American tradition against which to measure political leadership
and define the rule of law. "68
Levinson begins with "Jefferson's questionable expansion of
62. R. BERGER, supra note 24, at 258 n.39.
63. In 1945, Chief Justice Stone wrote, "My more conservative brethren in the
old days [read their preferences] into the Constitution . . . [H]istory is repeating
itself. The Court is now in as much danger of becoming a legislative and Consti
tution-making body, enacting into law its own predilections, as it was then." A.T.
MASON, SECURITY THROUGH FREEDOM: AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
PRACTICE 145-46 (1955). In 1976, Archibald Cox stated that "the Warren Court be
haved even more like a Council of Wise Men and less like a court than the laissez
faire Justices." A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERN
MENT 50 (1976).
64. R. BERGER, supra note 24, at 415 n.28.
65. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 36.
66. C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 209 (1960).
67. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 41.
68. Id.
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Presidential power in the decision to purchase Louisiana from
France in 1803. "69 Jefferson laid no claim to "expanded" power. As
Schlesinger described it, "Congress set up a clamor for Louisiana,
confirmed the envoys who negotiated the purchase, appropriated
the funds for the purchase, ratified the treaty consummating the
purchase and passed statutes authorizing the President to receive
the purchase . . . . "70 Even so, Jefferson entertained grave doubts
concerning the constitutional authority of both Congress and the
President to annex new territory, but was dissuaded from seeking
an amendment. 71 Napoleon was an unpredictable expansionist
neighbor who could block the Mississippi, and Congress and Jeffer
son acted before the mercurial Bonaparte could change his mind.
With good reason did Jefferson say, "The legislature ... must ...
throw themselves on their country for doing for them unau
thorized, what we know [the people] would have done for them
selves had they been in a situation to do it. "72 Jefferson did not
regard this as a "precedent" for unconstitutional executive acts.
Months after the purchase he wrote, "I had rather ask an enlarge
ment of power from the nation, where it is found necessary, than
.to assume it by a construction which would make our powers
.
boundless. "73 This was for him the "constant."
Next, Levinson refers to Lincoln's "putative disobedience of
constitutional provisions relating to habeas corpus. "74 Immediately
after the firing on Fort Sumter, while the Union was crumbling,
Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus to prevent armed se
cessionists from operating in Maryland. Maryland was swarming
with them and secessionist control might have isolated Washing
ton.75 Article I of the Constitution provides that the writ may be
suspended "when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety
may require it. "76 It does not say who may suspend, though infer
ably Congress was to do so because the power appears in the
69. Id.
70. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 23 (1973).
71. Id. at 24; S.E. MORISON, supra note 48, at 366. See also 4 J. ELLIOT, DE
BATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 450 n. (2d ed. 1836).
72. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 70, at 24.
73. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W.D. Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), reprinted in
8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 247 (P.L. Ford ed. 1897).
74. S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 42.
75. H.C. HOCKETT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES,
1826-1876, at 280-81 (1939); S.E. MORISON, supra note 48, at 612.
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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"legislative" article. Lincoln might have invoked the analogy of the
impeachment of Justices notwithstanding that the provision for im
peachment of "officers" is contained in the "executive" article.
Should Lincoln have waited to convene Congress, then not in ses
sion? Even today one cannot dismiss Lincoln's evaluation of the
imminent danger. When Congress assembled in July it accepted
Lincoln's measures willy-nilly. It was in these circumstances that
Lincoln asked, "Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and
the government itself to go to pieces, lest that one be violated?"77
Lincoln's "suspension" furnishes the only genuine illustration in
our history for Jefferson's 1810 statement, after he left the presi
dency, that the laws "of self-preservation, of saving our country
when in danger, are of a higher obligation" than a "strict obser
vance of the written laws. "78
These incidents yield Levinson a queer distillation: "The role
of the great political leader is often to assume the almost Nietzsc
hean task of going beyond the law in an effort to transform the
society which he purports to lead."79 We condone Lincoln's "dubi
ous" behavior, he continues, because "his memorable vision of
what this country was truly about, which involved transcending the
existing constitutional structure and its support for slavery, has
prevailed. . . . "80 But this reads subsequent events back into 1861.
The suspension of habeas corpus was altogether unrelated to slav
ery; it was designed to protect the capital from a potential enemy.
Lincoln himself wrote in August, 1862, "My paramount object in
this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to
destroy slavery."81 There was no commitment to freeing the slaves
in the early years of trial; that emerged as the fearful losses
mounted and as the North came to believe that once and for all the
cancer' which had eaten away at the vitals of the nation must be
eradicated.
Stranger yet is Levinson's question, "Was Nixon's offense his
disobedience of the law or, rather, his failure [unlike Lincoln] to
present a plausible case for his violations of law as necessary to
'national security?' "82 Since the publication of Levinson's article,
Nixon himself has explained that his "national security" measures
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 42.
A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 70, at 24-25.
S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 42 (emphasis added).
Id.
S,E. MORISON, supra note 48, at 616.
S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 42.
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were meant to stifle dissenters in order to prevent "those that we
were negotiating with in Paris" from "gain[ing] the impression that
they represent a majority." He too assimilated this to Lincoln's ac
tion for "the purpose of preserving the Constitution and the Na
tion," though he conceded that "in Lincoln's case it was the sur
vival of the Union in war time" that was at stake. But he concluded
that "This nation was torn apart in an ideological way by the war in
Vietnam, as much as the Civil War tore apart the nation when
Lincoln was President."83 Vietnam, however, was 6,000 miles
away, not next door as was Maryland; and habeas corpus was sus
pended in Maryland to insure defense of the capital, not to gag
dissent in the North. No President has been subjected to more
incessant, 'vitriolic calumny during the progress of a war than Lin
coln, yet he never resorted to wide-scale illegality to counter it.
Levinson compares the incommensurable. Nixon did not merely
fail "to present a plausible case"; under the circumstances, it was
impossible to do so. It would open a frightening chapter in our
history were dissent stifled to facilitate peace negotiations!
The great "Nietzschean task of going beyond the law in order
to transform the society"84 has led to a Hitler. Germany did not
have to wait for the verdict of posterity for "the final assessment
. . . whether the bet as to the shape of the future is won or lost;"85
in the process of realizing Hitler's apocalyptic vision Germany was
razed ~o the ground. Nothing in the Jefferson and Lincoln incidents
warrants Levinson's extravagant extrapolation; neither conceived of
himself as a "superman." A democracy which depends for its salva
tion on the vision of a "superman" has confessed its impotence and
is on the road to dictatorship.
Finally, Levinson remarks, "if law is only that which the
courts are prepared to enforce ... then it becomes impossible, by
definition, to accuse those institutions of disobeying the law. "86
The "enforce" definition was uttered by Holmes in the role of jural
philosopher, but he did not find it incompatible with his recogni
tion of "the right of the majority to embody their opinions in
law,"87 to which he felt bound to give effect despite his disagreement.
As judge, Justice Holmes stated that when a legislature "has inti

83.
84.
85.
86.
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N.Y. Times, May 20, 1977, § A, at 16, col. 1.
See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
S. Levinson, supra note 1, at 42.
[d. at 99 (emphasis original).
[d. at 38.
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mated its will . . . that will should be recognized and obeyed. "88
He condemned uncurbed judicial discretion to alter the law and
identify personal predilections with constitutional mandates, and he
recognized the perversion of due process that made such practices
possible. 89 He accepted the "will" of the people when he could
ascertain it and refused to change it to correspond to his predilec
tions. Not every phrase of the Constitution lends itself to such
analysis; some provisions are amorphous and afford judicial leeway.
But "due process" and "equal protection," which today furnish the
bulk of the Court's business, are, as I have elsewhere document
ed,90 not among them.

VI
In a brilliant study, THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE, J. W.N.
Sullivan pointed out that Heisenberg's "principle of indeterminacy"
had shaken the doctrine of strict causality in the atomic realm, but
concluded that for practical purposes men can continue to rely on
"cause and effect. "91 So too, whatever the philosophical doubts
about the nature of the rule of law, I consider that society may
safely continue to rely on it. With Charles McIlwain, I would urge
that "[t]he two fundamental correlative elements of con
stitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the
legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political responsibil
ity of government to the governed. "92 Without the rule of law
there is no accountability; recognition that Nixon had violated con
stitutional limits led to his banishment. It is not merely that re
spect for law binds our disparate elements together. Men cannot
live without civil order. Law furnishes protection against the dis
ruptive forces that would return us to the blood feud, against arbi
trary power; it assures an accused that he will be impartially tried
under existing law; and it furnishes a medium for the reconciliation
of conflicting interests. In a recent monograph, the English Marxist
historian, E. P. Thompson concluded:
[Tlhe rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon
power and the defense of the citizen from power· saIl-intrusive
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
1947).

Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (dissenting opinion).
R. BERGER, supra note 24, at 166-220.
J. SULLIVAN, THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE 69, 72 (1949).
C. McILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 146 (rev. ed.
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claims, seems to me to be an unqualified human good. To deny
or belittle this good is, in this dangerous century when the re
sources and pretensions of power continue to enlarge, a desper
ate error of intellectual abstraction. 93
93. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT
266 (1975).

